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Abstract: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) was
the first legally binding instrument explicitly focused on how human rights apply to people with
disability. Amongst their obligations, consistent with the social model of disability, the Convention
requires signatory nations to recognise that “ . . . persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on
an equal basis with others in all aspects of life” and mandates signatory nations to develop “ . . .
appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disability to the support they may require in
exercising their legal capacity”. The Convention promotes supported decision-making as one such
measure. Although Australia ratified the UNCRPD in 2008, it retains an interpretative declaration in
relation to Article 12 (2, 3, 4), allowing for the use of substituted decision-making in situations where
a person is assessed as having no or limited decision-making capacity. Such an outcome is common
for people with severe or profound intellectual disability because the assessments they are subjected
to are focused on their cognition and generally fail to take into account the interdependent nature
of human decision-making. This paper argues that Australia’s interpretative declaration is not in
the spirit of the Convention nor the social model of disability on which it is based. It starts from the
premise that the intention of Article 12 is to be inclusive of all signatory nations’ citizens, including
those with severe or profound cognitive disability. From this premise, arises a practical need to
understand how supported decision-making can be used with this group. Drawing from evidence
from an empirical study with five people with severe or profound intellectual disability, this paper
provides a rare glimpse on what supported decision-making can look like for people with severe
or profound intellectual disability. Additionally, it describes the importance of supporters having
positive assumptions of decision-making capacity as a factor affecting supported decision-making.
This commentary aims to give a focus for practice and policy efforts for ensuring people with severe
or profound cognitive disability receive appropriate support in decision-making, a clear obligation of
signatory nations of the UNCRPD. A focus on changing supporter attitudes rather than placing the
onus of change on people with disability is consistent with the social model of disability, a key driver
of the UNCRPD.
Keywords: UNCPRD; supported decision-making; severe or profound cognitive disability; human
rights; decision-making capacity
1. Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) is not only
the first human rights treaty of the twenty-first century, it is the first legally binding instrument that
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explicitly provides an explanation of how human rights can be applied to people with disability [1].
Although Australia ratified the Convention in 2008, it included an Interpretative Declaration specifically
relating to Article 12. An interpretative declaration is, “ . . . a unilateral statement, however phrased
or named, made by a State or an international organization, whereby that State or that organization
purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope of a treaty or of certain of its provisions” ([2], p. 21).
Australia’s Interpretative declaration relating to Article 12 states: “Australia declares its understanding
that the Convention allows for fully supported or substituted decision-making arrangements, which
provide for decisions to be made on behalf of a person, only where such arrangements are necessary,
as a last resort and subject to safeguards” [3]. Substituted decision-making occurs where “guardians
and administrators [are] appointed to make decisions in the ‘best interests’ of the person concerned”
([4], p. 26). Australia’s interpretative declaration has the effect of enabling Australia to retain laws
that use substituted decision-making in situations where a person is believed to have no or limited
decision-making capacity, denying them their right to legal capacity. Because such an assessment
outcome is common for people with severe or profound intellectual disability, Australia’s declaration
has the effect of excluding them from the protections promised under Article 12. It is important to
note that at the time at which Australia created the Interpretative Declaration, the theory around
supported decision-making and understanding of Article 12 was in its infancy. There is a clear need
to incorporate contemporary understandings of supported decision-making, the social model of
disability, and Article 12, into practice and legal reform particularly in relation to those with more
severe cognitive disability.
The UNCRPD promotes supported decision making as the vehicle by which people with
disabilities can exercise their legal capacity to the greatest extent possible [1]. Considering its clear
relationship with supported decision-making it is important to operationally define legal capacity, as it
is conceptualised in this paper. Legal capacity is a universal human attribute enshrined in law. It allows
a person to be recognised as a person before the law [1]. Accepting the right to legal capacity as a given,
this paper’s focus is on the more practical construct of decision-making capacity. Decision-making
capacity is conceptualised within the context of this paper as a person’s ability to lead a self-directed
life with support. It is acknowledged that while the term “decision-making capacity” is not considered
synonymous with the notion of legal capacity, where a person is perceived to have decision-making
capacity, they are more likely to have their right to legal capacity, under Article 12 realised.
From here on the term severe or profound intellectual/cognitive disability is used to describe
those who are the focus of this paper. Over the last two decades, philosophies that have emerged within
disability culture generally have discouraged the use of labels to describe people with intellectual
disability for fear of their individuality being buried within stereotypes. Despite these views, there
is a compelling argument for using specific language to signal the unique, and poorly understood,
support needs of people with severe or profound cognitive disability. Although the use of a label
does not take precedence over seeing the person first, an explicit acknowledgment of their needs is
necessary if they are to receive the significant support they require to lead a self-determined life.
People with severe or profound intellectual disability require support in most aspects of
their lives. They generally communicate informally using nonverbal behaviours such as facial
expression, gesticulation, vocalisations, eye gaze and touch. They have difficulty understanding formal
communication such as speech, sign, written text, pictures, or photos. In addition to communicating
informally, many people with severe or profound intellectual disability communicate unintentionally.
This means, they appear unaware that their actions can have an impact on their environment. This
means that for effective information transfer communication partners infer meaning from the person’s
behaviours, an activity acknowledged in the intellectual disability related literature as an ambiguous
and subjective task [5–7].
While research and practice guidance focused on Article 12 and supported decision-making
for people with mild to moderate cognitive disability and mental illness is emerging [8–11], such
guidance is clearly lacking for people with severe or profound cognitive disability. There are likely
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to be numerous reasons for this lack of empirical attention. Firstly, within an Australian context,
while an interpretative declaration allowing for substitute decision-making for people with severe or
profound cognitive disability is in place, there is no legislative incentive for researchers to work toward
enhancing this group’s capacity to lead self-directed lives. Moreover, there is less ambiguity around
the intention of Article 12 for people with milder as opposed to more profound cognitive disability,
making research with this group less attractive. Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake, examining the granting
of personhood through the permitting or denying of legal capacity, have articulated this, describing
people with severe/profound cognitive disability as the “hard cases” ([12], p. 98). Additionally, a lack
of empirical attention maybe due to widely-held prejudices regarding people with severe or profound
cognitive disability’s ability and right to be supported to lead self-directed lives [13,14].
These beliefs regarding people with severe or profound cognitive disability’s ability and right to
be supported to lead self-directed lives maybe rooted in the premise that a person’s ability to make
and communicate decisions is characterised solely by a set of cognitive based pre-requisites, such as
an ability to understand abstract notions of causality. These cognitive skills are seen as independent of
environmental factors such as support from family and friends [15]. These beliefs are emphatically
rejected within the social model of disability [16–18]. Clough ([18], p. 31) argues that this focus on
individualised cognitive skills “fails to accord with the reality of human interdependence” Moreover,
Kittay argues that although the phenomenon of human interdependence is considered acceptable
within the non-disabled community, for people with the most profound disabilities different rules
apply. Rather than being embraced, their dependency on others is exceptionalised as problematic and
in order to be recognised as having a human right to lead a self-directed life, they are expected to
measure up to standards of cognitive capacity not applied to the rest of the population [17].
Such a focus on cognitive as opposed to ecological barriers to self-determination is exemplified in
the medical model of disability and is in direct conflict with the social model, firmly embedded
within the UNCRPD. The social model of disability promotes that the barriers and enablers to
self-determination exist well beyond an individual, and are constructed by the society in which a person
lives. Such an ecological view of self-determination is consistent with a supported decision-making
approach, and places the onus of change on supporters, rather than those being supported. Brayley
reflects Kittay’s views calling for a system of law that moves away from this focus on cognition,
to one that universally recognises that a person’s legal capacity (and consequently their recognition as
a person) does not rest on their individual cognitive capability but on the quality of support available
to help them to make decisions [19]. Beamer and Brooks articulated this view half a decade before the
drafting of the UNCRPD stating that:
The starting point is not a test of capacity, but the presumption that every human being
is communicating all the time and that this communication will include preferences.
Preferences can be built up into expressions of choice and these into formal decisions. From
this perspective, where someone lands on a continuum of capacity is not half as important
as the amount and type of support they get to build preferences into choices. ([20], p. 4)
There is little doubt that the cognitive approach to the granting of legal capacity underlies
Australia’s interpretative declaration in relation to Article 12. As described such an approach is
reflective of the medical as opposed to the social model of disability. Considering the importance
of the social model of disability within the drafting of the UNCRPD, it can be argued that while
it continues to have an interpretative declaration with regard to Article 12 in place, Australia is
contravening the Convention. McSherry further articulates this concern suggesting that while the
universality of Article 12 is not recognised Australia is not acting within the spirit of the Convention [4].
Reinforcing these concerns, in 2014 the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
shared this view, articulating that it was “...concerned about the possibility of maintaining the regime
of substitute decision-making, and that there is still no detailed and viable framework for supported
decision-making in the exercise of legal capacity . . . The Committee recommends that the State
party [Australia] uses effectively the current inquiry process to take immediate steps to replace
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substitute decision-making with supported decision-making and provides a wide range of measures
which respect the person’s autonomy, will and preferences and is in full conformity with article 12
of the Convention” [21]. In response to the UN Committee’s report, the Australian Law Reform
Commission (ALRC) mirrored the Committee’s concerns in its 2014 Inquiry and Report, Equality,
Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws [22]. In its report the Commission emphasised the
universality of the right to lead a self-directed life, suggesting that the understanding articulated in the
Australian Declaration does not comprehend the true intention of Article 12, which extends beyond
the provision of supported decision-making to include measures that respect a person’s autonomy,
will and preferences. The notion of ‘will and preference’, which is particularly relevant to people
with severe or profound cognitive disability is explicitly mentioned in Article 12 (4) of the UNCRPD,
indicating the Article’s clear intention to be inclusive of this group. In its report the ALRC pays explicit
attention to the exclusionary impact this lack of understanding of the intention of Article 12, has on
people with severe or profound cognitive disability [22].
2. Empirical Study Methodology
This paper draws on research with five people with severe or profound intellectual disability and
their support networks [23,24]. Each participant and their support network participated in a supported
decision-making process [25]. This process provided a lens through which to observe and characterise
the phenomena of supported decision-making and identify practical strategies for the realisation of
Article 12 for this group. An interpretative, multiple case study design was used, and interview, focus
group, questionnaire and observation data were collected and analysed.
The process of gaining ethics approval for this study was complex. There is ample discussion
in the literature regarding the vulnerability of people with severe to profound cognitive disabilities
when participating in research [26,27]. The HREC that evaluated the research proposal had particular
concerns relating to obtaining consent from research participants with cognitive disability. The
researcher spent considerable time with the HREC discussing these concerns, particularly the ethical
question around whether to exclude this group from the study and its associated benefits or obtain
proxy consent from people who know them well. A decision was made to obtain proxy consent from
those who knew the participants well, using the principles of supported decision-making embedded
in the study itself. It is important to note that there is concern in the literature around the validity of
proxy reporting with regard to the expression of personal preferences [28,29]. McVilly et al. (2000)
stated, “overall research findings to date indicate a need for caution when interpreting proxy-based
data” ([29], p. 60). Heeding these concerns, those providing proxy consent were required to adhere
to the principle of assent, an important characterisation of supported decision-making methodology
used in the study. That meant any consents obtained by proxy were required to be accompanied by
nonverbal indications that the person was comfortable participating in the study, and as mandated
by the National Human Medical Research Committee (NHMRC) any indication at any time over the
course of the study of refusal to participate had to be respected [30].
3. Empirical Study Findings and Implications
3.1. Characterising Supported Decision-Making for People with Severe or Profound Cognitive Disability
There is no doubt that supported decision-making for people with severe or profound cognitive
disability is likely to look different than for other members of the population, but it is also undeniable
that decision-making is a mandated right for all citizens living in jurisdictions that are signatory to
the UNCRPD. This begs the question of “what is decision-making” for this group, or perhaps more
usefully framed, “what is supported decision-making?”
An analysis of the study’s data provided a characterisation of supported decision-making for
people with severe or profound intellectual disability, in terms of two distinct but interdependent
roles. The data highlights the roles played by (a) the person with a disability (supported); and (b)
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the supporters in the supported decision-making process. The role of the person with a disability
in this dynamic was to express will and preference, either intentionally or unintentionally, using a
range of communication modalities, including behaviour, vocalisation, vocal pitch, muscle tone, facial
expression, eye movement, and physiological reactions (e.g., changes in breathing patterns). The role
of supporters within this dynamic is to respond to the expression of will and preference of those they
support. Within this decision-making dynamic, supporter responsiveness, as opposed to focus people’s
expression of preference, is the component that is amenable to change through structured practice
guidance, making the enablement of responsiveness a crucial strategy for supported decision-making.
3.2. Supporter Responsiveness
The act of supporter responsiveness is not well examined in the research literature, and therefore,
is poorly understood. The data collected evidenced that supporter responsiveness to the expression
of will and preference of those they support is a multi-faceted activity, made up of a number of
tasks. These tasks include acknowledging, interpreting and acting on the expression of will and
preference of those they support. The study has highlighted, that although each of these tasks are
important, none of them in isolation, characterise responsiveness. Rather, supporter responsiveness
was observed to be reliant on the implementation of these tasks collectively. To respond, firstly
supporters acknowledged/noticed, as opposed to ignored, expressions of preference, secondly, they
interpreted these expressions of preference, assigning meaning to them, and thirdly they acted on
this meaning.
In addition to the previous characterization, key factors underlying supporter responsiveness
to the will and preference of people with severe or profound intellectual disability within
a supported decision-making context were identified and examined. These factors were clustered
into five overarching domains, (1) focus person’s attributes; (2) supporter attitudes and perceptions;
(3) relational closeness; (4) functioning and make up of circles of support; and (5) characteristics of
the service system. A discussion of each of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper, and will be
reported elsewhere. The remainder of this paper will focus on one identified theme, the association
between supporter responsiveness to expressions of will and preference and the views they hold
regarding the ability of those they support to lead self-directed lives. This emphasis on supporter
responsiveness to the expression of preference of those they support is consistent with the social model
of disability (embedded within the UNCRPD), where the onus of change is not on the person with
a disability, but rather, the environment of which they are a part.
3.3. Supporters’ Views Regarding the Ability of Those They Support to Lead Self-Directed Lives
The literature highlights a widely held belief that concepts relating to self-determination and
autonomy are irrelevant to people with cognitive disability, because they have limited ability to
lead self-directed lives [31–35]. “Historically, people with an intellectual disability have been
assumed to be incapable of exercising the sort of control over their own lives which others take for
granted” ([32], p. 362). Jenkinson and Nelms made the point: “since by definition intellectual disability
is characterized by significant impairments in adaptive behaviour, discretion, social competence,
and comprehension of own self-interest, the temptation has been to presume total incompetence in
decision-making” ([36], p. 199). Ward and Stewart, referring to people with intellectual disability,
stated “it is often assumed that they are eternal children, unable to speak on their own behalf and
therefore not competent to make their own decisions” ([34], p. 305). This negative perception of
the ability of those they support to lead self-directed lives is particularly apparent for people with
severe or profound cognitive disability. Wehmeyer, Agran and Hughes surveyed over a thousand
teachers regarding their understanding of self-determination of their students. They reported that the
severity of a student’s disability influenced these teachers’ perceptions of the self-determination of their
students. Specifically, teachers working with students with severe or profound intellectual disability
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rated the capacity of their students to make decisions significantly lower than their colleagues working
with students with milder intellectual disability [37].
The value of supporters having a positive perception of the ability of those they support to
lead self-directed lives is reflected within the research literature. This literature provides evidence
that people are more likely to lead self-determined lives, when those who support them have
a positive view of their ability to lead self-directed lives [38,39]. Reviewing over one hundred articles,
Harchik et al. (1993) concluded that people who are expected to express choice and preference are more
likely to behave autonomously, be happy, and exhibit positive as opposed to negative behaviour [38].
Rawlings et al. (1995) conducted a participant observation study of four women with intellectual
disability. They concluded that supporters who presume those they support can guide the decisions
that are made about them are likely to be willing and able to “encourage, recognise and respond
to expressions of choice” ([39], p. 143). In contrast, Antaki et al., drawing from their analysis of
interactions between staff and fifteen people with intellectual disability, report that the negative
perceptions of the capacity of a person to guide their own decisions, is one factor responsible for
reducing the opportunities people with intellectual disability have for decision-making [40]. The
impact of supporters’ assumptions regarding a person’s ability to lead a self-directed life is not only
reflected in the research literature relating to people with intellectual disability, but also that related to
acquired brain injury (ABI). Drawing from two case studies and the research literature, Knox et al. (2013)
discuss the impact of clinicians holding negative assumptions regarding decision-making for people
with ABI. They suggest that negative assumptions held by rehabilitation professionals that people
with ABI cannot participate in decisions is a factor that influences the self-determination of their
patients [41].
The importance of positive perceptions of a person’s ability to lead self-directed lives is not only
reflected in the research literature, but in principles guiding contemporary law and policy. For example,
the UNCRPD promotes an assumption of decision-making capacity [1], while the English and Welsh
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), has as its first principle, a need for supporters to assume a person
has decision-making capacity [42]. This focus on the need for a change in supporter attitudes, rather
than a change in people with disability, is reflected in the social model of disability, solidly embedded
within the UNCRPD.
Findings from my research further highlights the importance of supporters having positive
perceptions of the ability of those they support to make decisions. Supporters who held such
perceptions, predominantly demonstrated greater responsiveness to expressions of will and preference
overall, than those who did not hold these beliefs. Considering the value of supporter responsiveness
within a supported decision-making process, this finding is legally and practically important.
It reinforces the value of inclusion of principles such as “a person must be assumed to have capacity”,
in legal frameworks such as the UNCRPD [1] and the English and Welsh Mental Capacity Act [42].
In practice, it points to a need for supporters having a belief in the universality of decision-making
capacity, inclusive of those with severe or profound cognitive disability.
4. Conclusions
Australia’s interpretative declaration regarding Article 12 of the UNCRPD, allowing for
substituted decision-making, stems from a belief that some Australians, such as those with severe
or profound cognitive disability, are not capable of having their will and preference reflected in the
decisions made about them. This paper has challenged this view, providing a characterisation of
supported decision-making for people with severe or profound cognitive disability.
Supported decision-making for people with severe to profound intellectual disability is
an interdependent and complex process carried out between supporters and supported. Within
this dynamic, both parties contribute differently. The person facing the decision contributes by
expressing their will and preference, using a range of informal communication methods such as body
language, facial expression, gesture, and physiological reactions (e.g., changed breathing patterns).
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Supporters contribute to the process by responding to these expressions of will and preference,
through acknowledging (as opposed to ignoring), interpreting and acting on this expression. Effective
supporter responsiveness was found to be most likely when supporters had a positive view of the
decision-making capacity of those they supported.
This paper calls for an emphasis on legislative, policy and practice guidance that aims to enhance
supporters’ understanding that a person’s ability to lead a self-directed life is universal, as relevant
to people with severe or profound cognitive disability as those with milder disability. The findings
reported in this paper, point to the value of this emphasis in enhancing supporter responsiveness to
a person’s will and preference, an essential component of supported decision-making. Such a focus
is consistent with the social model of disability, a construct that is core to the UNCRPD, where
the onus of change is not on the person with a disability, but the environment of which they are
a part. This environment includes the perceptions supporters hold regarding a person’s ability to lead
a self-directed life, and therefore have access to supported approaches to decision-making. Without
this focus, the promises of Article 12, and the recommendations of the ALRC report, are likely to
remain a pipe dream for people with severe or profound cognitive disability and their supporters.
Due to their complex lives decision-making is obviously challenging for people with more severe
cognitive disability. However, if signatory nations to the UNCRPD are to live up to their obligations
under Article 12, interpretative declarations, such as Australia’s need to be abandoned, and significant
attention needs to be paid to how best to support all citizens to have their preferences heard and
reflected in the decisions that are made about their lives, both practically and within the context of
law reform.
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